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INFORMED CONSENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ARE THEY
COMPATIBLE WHEN IT COMES TO VACCINES?

WENDY E. PARMET*

In 1902, there were 284 deaths from smallpox in Massachusetts.'
Responding to the outbreak, the Cambridge Department of Public Health enacted2
an ordinance requiring citizens to be vaccinated or show proof of vaccination.
4
3
Henning Jacobson refused to comply. He was tried and convicted in state court.
Affirming his conviction in the seminal case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, Justice
John Marshall Harlan articulated in strong and eloquent words the right of a
society not only to promote vaccination but to require citizens to be vaccinated:
"[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the
right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of
its members."5 Vaccination against smallpox, he concluded, was one protection
that the state had the right to insist upon for the common good.
Less than ten years later, another great jurist and future Supreme Court
Justice, Benjamin Cardozo, sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, heard
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, a case concerning a woman who
claimed that she was operated on without her consent. 6 In considering whether the
charitable hospital could be liable for an alleged trespass, Judge Cardozo declared:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body.",7 In issuing this powerful affirmation of selfdetermination that helped to give rise to the right of informed consent, 8 Judge
Cardozo never cited Jacobson, nor did he consider how to apply the principle of
self-determination when vaccinations are required to control a dangerous epidemic.
Today, as we contemplate the need for new vaccinations and new
vaccination campaigns to meet the threat of emerging infectious diseases such as
* George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews University Distinguished Professor of Law,
Northeastern
University. Many thanks to Kavita Bhandary, Ethan Eddy, Laurie Martindale, and Beeta Shapiro for
their excellent research help and Jan McNew, as always, for her superlative secretarial assistance.
1. Massachusetts Dep't of Health, Infectious Disease Deaths (unpublished data, on file with the
Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
2. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13 (1905).
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 14.
5. Id. at 27.
6. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).

7. Id. at 93.
8. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 397 (3d ed.

1997).
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SARS or bioterrorist attacks, it is more important than ever to examine the
relationship between the principles enunciated in Jacobson and those expressed in
Schloendorff and ask whether it is possible to be faithful to both. More
particularly, as we try to develop new vaccines and plan for their mass
administration in the event of a public health emergency (whether manmade or
natural), we need to consider whether we can adhere to Jacobson's recognition of
the importance of public health and Schloendorff's respect for what has become
known as informed consent.
On their faces, the two principles would seem difficult if not impossible to
reconcile, at least in the case of vaccinations used in emergencies. 9 Indeed, the
very notion of informed consent seems somewhat inapt in the case of a medical
intervention that the government may, according to Jacobson, constitutionally
mandate.' 0 After all, informed consent and self-determination seem, at first blush,
to emphasize an individualism at odds with Jacobson's emphasis on the common
good and the use of vaccinations as a public health measure. Moreover, legal
requirements for informed consent may create practical hurdles to the development
and administration of the new vaccines we may need to meet tomorrow's public
health threats. Informed consent can, for example, add cumbersome steps to the
administration of vaccinations in situations in which time is of the essence. It also
creates risks of liability that may undermine efforts to attract research and
investment in the development of new vaccines. For all of these reasons, public
health advocates and policymakers may be tempted to say that we should not insist
upon informed consent for vaccinations during public health emergencies." Less
drastically, federal legislation designed to promote the development of new
vaccines would significantly curtail manufacturers' legal liability for failing to
inform consumers of the potential risks of their vaccines.12

9. For general discussions of the conflicts between individual rights and the public good in the
face of public health threats, see George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1337 (2002); Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How FarAre
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003); Wendy E.
Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on Lawrence 0. Gostin 's
Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221 (2003).
10. See generally Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 1105 (1905). As one court noted, the choice given
in such a situation seems to be a "Hobson's choice" that cannot readily be called free. Allison v.
Merck, 878 P.2d 948, 954-55 n.9 (Nev. 1994).
11. Hence, the proposed Model State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA"), while
maintaining the form of informed consent, would have empowered state officials to require individuals
to be vaccinated on pain of detention. The MSEHPA was drafted by the Center for Law and the
Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities. See THE CENTER FOR LAW AND THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH

AT GEORGETOWN

AND

JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITIES,

THE MODEL

STATE

EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 603(b)(3) (2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/
MSEHPA2.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). For a further discussion of the role of informed consent
when choices are so curtailed, see infra Part Ill.
12. For a full discussion of this legislation, see infra notes 112-17, 135-39 and accompanying text.
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But are informed consent and public health necessarily incompatible? In this
Article, I will argue that they are not. To the contrary, informed consent actually
serves public health. More specifically, I will contend that informed consent
advances four major goals: compensation of injuries, prevention of injuries,
promotion of trust, and recognition of choice. Each of these goals is important to
the protection and promotion of public health. However, for informed consent to
best advance these goals during a public health emergency, our vision of informed
consent may need to change from a narrow, individually-based litigation right to a
broader, public health principle.
I begin in Part I by discussing why vaccines are important to public health
and how the law has been used to promote them. In Part II, I turn to informed
consent, providing first an overview of the concept and its core components. I then
examine more closely the four different goals promoted by informed consent and
explain why in the case of vaccinations each of these goals helps to protect public
health. Finally, in Part III, I discuss how informed consent can be reformulated to
reflect and promote public health.

PART I: VACCINATIONS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE

A. Vaccinations as Public Health Interventions
There can be little doubt that vaccinations are among the most important and
successful public health interventions. They have led to the eradication of
smallpox as a natural disease 13 and the virtual disappearance of polio and the iron
lung from the developed world. 14 Moreover, vaccinations have caused dramatic
declines in the United States of many other once common killers, including
diphtheria, tetanus, measles, and Haempophilus influenzae type B. 15 Vaccinations
have also saved billions of dollars by dramatically reducing morbidity and
mortality. 16

13. Holly Myers et al., The Threat of Smallpox: Eradicated but not Erased, J. HOMELAND
SECURITY (Feb. 2004), at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/gurskysmallpox.html (last

visited Feb. 23, 2005). Of course, this eradication has brought its own risk. With the eradication of
smallpox, humanity has lost its immunity to the disease, potentially making smallpox an extraordinarily
lethal biological weapon.
2003).

See id (noting 119 million Americans are susceptible to the disease as of

14. Polio is now endemic in only seven nations. WORLD HEALTH ORG., POLIOMYELITIS, FACT
SHEET NO. 114, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs1 14/en! (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); see
also GLAXOSMITHKLINE, DISEASES: POLIOMYELITIS, at http://www.worldwidevaccines.com/polio/
epidemiology2.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
15. COMM. ON IMMUNIZATION FINANCE POLICIES AND PRACTICES, INST. OF MED., CALLING THE
SHOTS: IMMUNIZATION FINANCE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 18 (2000).

16. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of
Vaccinating Their Children?,37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 353, 369 (2004).
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Importantly, many vaccines (but not all) are critical public health tools
providing protection even to individuals who have not been vaccinated. By
reducing the number of people capable of transmitting an infectious disease in a
given population, vaccines help to interrupt the transmission of the targeted
disease, resulting in a "herd immunity"' 7 that can offer protection even to
individuals who are not vaccinated or who do not become immune following
vaccination. 18 As a result, vaccinations can lower the incidence of a disease in a
community or population, benefiting the population as a whole. 19 For diseases
such as smallpox, for which there is no known therapeutic intervention, this ability
to protect the population is especially significant.
The ability of vaccines to reduce the risk for populations, however, raises a
problem characteristic of many public health issues. Because it lowers the
incidence of a disease in a population, vaccination-acquired immunity is a classic
public good, susceptible to free-riders.2 ° In a population in which a high
percentage of people are vaccinated, individuals deciding whether they or their
children should be vaccinated, face a relatively low risk of the natural disease. For
these people, it may appear rational to be a free-rider and enjoy the benefits of
living in a vaccinated population without incurring the risks of vaccination. 2 1 This

17. COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE FINANCING IN THE U.S., BOARD ON
HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY 27 (2004) [hereinafter FINANCING VACCINES]. As

the Institute of Medicine makes clear, vaccines vary with respect to their public health benefit. Id.
Some vaccines, such as the human rabies vaccine, which is given rarely and only to exposed
individuals, would appear to serve primarily as a clinical intervention to a threatened individual. Id.
Other vaccines, such as the polio and smallpox vaccines which have freed whole populations of
diseases that once were common and easily communicable, have significant public benefits. See id.
18. Id. Different diseases require different percentages of a population to be vaccinated in order
for herd immunity to occur. See Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The
Public Health Imperative and ndividual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 262-80 (Richard
Goodman et al. eds. 2003). Some vaccines can actually provide immunity for individuals who have not
been vaccinated. Paul E. M. Fine & llona A. M. Cameiro, Transmissibility and Persistence of Oral
Polio Vaccine Viruses: Implicationsfor the Global Poliomyelitis Eradication Initiative, 150 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1001 (1999). For example, the oral polio vaccine can protect unvaccinated persons by
exposing them to a weakened virus that is shed from the intestines of a vaccinated person. Id.
19. FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 17.

20. A free-rider is an actor who does not bear his or her fair share of the cost of his or her use of a
public good. The free-rider phenomenon only becomes a problem or an inefficiency when it leads to
either excessive use of a public good or failure to participate in the collective action that produces the
good

in the first place.

See, e.g.,

RICHARD CORNES &

TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF

EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 541 (2d ed. 1996). The Institute of Medicine also
notes that vaccine research is a public good because "it involves the identification of basic scientific
knowledge that benefits everyone and is not diminished by someone's use of that knowledge."
FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 17, at 43.

21. Doren D. Fredrickson et al., Childhood Immunization Refusal: Provider and Parent
Perceptions, 36 FAMILY MED. 431, 436 (2004) (noting that "some non-immunizing parents are aware
that their children may be at lower risk if most other children in the community are immunized"),
http://stfm.org/fmhub/fm2004/June/Doren43I.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). See also Bryan L.

INFORMED CONSENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

2005]

problem may be exacerbated by the fact that as more people are vaccinated, more
adverse events will occur (in aggregate), which may lead to a growing perception
that vaccines are risky.22 As Steve P. Calandrillo has noted: "Ironically, the
success of immunization programs has led to proportionately greater concerns
regarding vaccine safety today than worries about the illnesses that vaccines
prevent.

' 23
,

The public benefits that result from vaccinations, as well as the free-rider
problem, provide strong rationales for legal interventions in support of vaccines.24
Indeed, vaccinations may also be viewed as a public health intervention because
they generally occur in the context of an organized collective undertaking to
vaccinate a population.25 From the beginning, vaccines have been administered
not only as an individual clinical intervention, but as part of an organized public or
social response to a disease that threatened a community's health.26
As a public health intervention, vaccines have long been regulated, promoted,
and even, at times, compelled by law. In the United States, the roots of legal
support for vaccination date to colonial times, when the city of Boston, faced with
smallpox, provided free variolation (a forerunner of vaccination that inoculated an
individual with smallpox pus to provide protection from the disease).27 By the
early eighteenth century, after the introduction of Edward Jenner's smallpox

Martin et al., Adverse Reaction to Vaccines, 24 CLINICAL REVIEWS IN ALLERGY & IMMUNOLOGY 263-

76 (2003) (documenting parents' fear that vaccinations may hurt their children).
22. Perceptions of risk are also undoubtedly affected by the wide array of anti-vaccine
information, much of it erroneous, available on the Internet. Robert M. Wolfe et al., Content and
Design Attributes of Antivaccination Web Sites, 287 JAMA 3245 (2002) (reviewing web sites and
speculating that they may influence parents).
23. Calandrillo, supra note 16, at 404. See also Fredrickson et al., supra note 21, at 431 (reporting
perceptions that vaccines may be unsafe).
24. Hence, even theorists who oppose broad conceptions of public health and use of the police
power have supported interventions on behalf of vaccinations, at least under some circumstances. See
Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the "Old" Public Health, 46
PERSP. INBIOLOGY & MED. 138 (Supp. Summer 2003).
25. The Institute of Medicine has defined public health as "what we,as a society, do collectively to
assure the conditions for people to be healthy." COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB.
HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH 19 (1988) [hereinafter FUTURE OF PUB.
HEALTH]. Of course, vaccination will not always satisfy this definition. An individual who lives in
Massachusetts and seeks to be vaccinated for yellow fever, which is not recommended for someone in
the United States who is not traveling, cannot be said to participate in a collective public undertaking.
But public support for vaccinations in the United States is widespread. Approximately half of all
childhood vaccines, for example, are provided with public funds. See Ian Maclean Smith, Vaccinations,
at http://www.vh.org/adult/patient/intemalmedicine/aba30/1997/vaccinel.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2005).
26. See FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, supranote 25.
27. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State
in the FramingEra, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 289 (1993).
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vaccine (which relied upon the less dangerous cowpox virus), 28 Congress adopted
a law empowering the President to "appoint an agent to preserve the genuine
vaccine matter, and to furnish the same to any citizen of the United States. 29
In more recent decades, legal efforts to support vaccination have taken
several different forms. 30 First, the federal government, through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), has supported basic research on vaccines.3 1 Second,
through the auspices of the Food and Drug Administration, the federal government
has closely regulated the production of vaccines. 32 In addition, both state and
federal governments have followed the example of seventeenth century Boston by
providing financial support for vaccinations to individuals who cannot otherwise
afford them. For example, the federal government is the single largest purchaser of
vaccines. 33 Under the Vaccines for Children Program, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) negotiates large purchase contracts with
manufacturers and makes vaccines available to uninsured and some under-insured
children. 34 Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) also pay for vaccinations for their covered populations. 35 In

28. Cynthia P. Schneider & Michael D. McDonald, "The King of Terrors" Revisited: The
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign and Its Lessons for Future Biopreparedness,31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS

580, 581 (2003).
29. James G. Hodge & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical,Social,
andLegalPerspectives, 90 Ky.L.J. 831, 844 (2001-2002).
30. Despite the efforts described below, supplies of recommended vaccines have frequently run
short. Those studying the problem have cited numerous possible causes, including regulatory hurdles,
market failures, and fears of liability. See, e.g., FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 17, at 73-79;
National Vaccine Advisory Committee, Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines
in the United States: Recommendations from the National Vaccine Advisory Committee, 290 JAMA
3122, 3124-25 (2003); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDHOOD VACCINES: ENSURING AN
SUPPLY
POSES
CONTINUING
CHALLENGES
(2002) [hereinafter
GAO],
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02987.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
31. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the NIH spent $978 million on vaccine development and
another $1.1 billion on "vaccine-related" research. NIH, ESTIMATES OF FUNDING FOR VARIOUS
DISEASES, CONDITIONS, RESEARCH AREAS (Jan. 18, 2005), http://www.nih.gov/news/fundingresearch
areas.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
32. For a discussion of the regulation of vaccine production in the United States and in other
nations, see generally Julie B. Milstien, Regulation of Vaccines: Strengthening the Science Base, 25 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 173 (2004).
33. GAO, supra note 30, at 5.
34. Id.
ADEQUATE

35. See

CENTER

FOR MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVICES

(CMS),

STAY

HEALTHY,

at

http://www.medicare.gov/Health/Overview.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2005); CMS, MEDICAID: A BRIEF
SUMMARY, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/default4.asp
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2005); CMS, STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/consumers-default.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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addition, the federal government has purchased vaccines36 to stockpile in the event
of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency.
Two additional forms of legal support for vaccines deserve particular
mention in anticipation of our discussion of vaccines and informed consent. First,
to ensure a stable market for vaccines by reducing manufacturers' risk of liability,
the federal government has enacted several compensation programs. For example,
in 1976, fearful about a potential outbreak of "swine flu," Congress enacted the
National Swine Flu Immunization Program, which enabled individuals who were
injured by the swine flu vaccine to sue the government, rather than the
manufacturer. 37 More broadly, in 1986 Congress enacted the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act ("NCVIA"), which established a limited federal no-fault
remedy for injuries resulting from listed childhood vaccines. More recently, the
Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act ("SEPPA") provided a limited
federal remedy for injuries arising from smallpox vaccinations given pursuant to a
declared "smallpox emergency response plan. 39 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly for a discussion of informed consent, state governments have
This highly
mandated certain vaccinations, especially for schoolchildren. 40
controversial use of the law to compel vaccinations is discussed in Section B.

36. The Strategic National Stockpile, formerly known as the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, is
a national repository for antibiotics, chemical antidotes, and other medical equipment. See CDC,
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp (last visited Feb. 23,
2005). The Department of Homeland Security's fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $400 million
for the stockpile. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT BUSH SIGNS
=
BIODEFENSE FOR THE 21 sTCENTURY, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content
3522&print-true (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
37. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)). The Act amended § 317(k) of
the Public Health Services Act. Id. For discussions of this program, see Thomas E. Baynes, Jr.,
Liabilityfor Vaccine RelatedInjuries: Public Health Considerationsand Some Reflections on the Swine
Flu Experience, 21 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 44 (1977); Cyril H. Wecht, The Swine Flu Immunization
Program:Scientific Venture or PoliticalFolly?, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 425 (1977/1978).
38. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3756 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 to 34 (West
2003 & Supp. 2004). The Act permits individuals to seek a civil remedy only after pursuing the
statutory no-fault scheme. Id.at §300aa- 11. For a discussion on the Act and its efficacy, see Elizabeth
C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351 (2001).
39. Pub. L. No. 108-020, §2, 117 Stat. 638, 639 (2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §239 (West Supp.
2004)). For a fuller discussion of this act, see generally Edward P. Richards et al., Smallpox Vaccine
Injury and Law Guide (June 7, 2004), http://biotech.law.lsu.edufblaw/bt/smallpox/svlaw.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005); Myers et al., supra note 13.
40. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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B. The Police Powers and Vaccination
Although it has always been controversial, legal requirements for vaccination
date to the early days of vaccination. In 1827, Boston became the first city to
require children to be vaccinated before entering school. 4 1 By the late 1800s, many
states relied upon their police power to enact similar laws.42 Frequently, these
43
laws were challenged in court, the first recorded challenge occurring in 1830.
For the most part, lower courts upheld these laws, often on the rather dubious
proposition that they did not actually require a child to be vaccinated; they simply
made vaccination a prerequisite for obtaining the "privilege" of education.44
One of the most important challenges to vaccination laws occurred in 1900
when the plague came to San Francisco's Chinatown. 45 The Board of Health
responded to the threat by adopting a resolution requiring the inoculation of all
46
Chinese residents of the city with a serum known as the Haffkine prophylactic.
The resolution was enforced by a quarantine forbidding Chinese residents to leave
unless they were vaccinated. 47 The Board's resolution was challenged in federal
48

court.

In its opinion in Wong Wai v. Williamson, the court noted that it was required
to "review such legislation, and determine whether it in reality relates to, and is
appropriate to secure, the object in view ... .,,49 According to the court, the San
Francisco resolution did not meet the test because the vaccination order was not
based on any "established distinction in the conditions that are supposed to attend
this plague, or the persons exposed to its contagion, but they are boldly directed
against the Asiatic or Mongolian race as a class .

. .

.,

In addition, the court

noted that requiring a vaccination only for individuals who leave the infected area
made little sense, since the prophylactic was not recommended for people who had

41. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 29, at 851.
42. See id. (listing states such as New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and others that enacted
school vaccination laws between 1855 and 1889).
43. Id. at 853 (citing Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt. 427 (1830)).
44. Id. at 862 (citing Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ., 58 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1948)).
45. For a full discussion of the episode, see MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE: THE BLACK
DEATH IN

VICTORIAN

SAN FRANCISCO

(2003); NAYAN SHAH,

EPIDEMICS

AND RACE IN

SAN

FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN (2001).

46. The vaccine had been developed a few years earlier by Swiss bacteriologist, Waldemar
Haffkine. It had not been proven effective and was believed by many to cause numerous side effects,
including possibly death. HOWARD MARKEL, WHEN GERMS TRAVEL 71 (2004).

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 72.
Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 2-3 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
Id. at 7 (quoting Blue v. Beach, 56 N.E. 89, 93 (Ind. 1900)).
Id.
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already been exposed to the plague. 51 As a result, the court52saw the ordinance as
discriminatory and "not within the legitimate police power.,
Five years later, the issue of compulsory vaccination appeared before the
United States Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.53 As in Wong Wai,
the case concerned a vaccination order issued in response to an outbreak, this time
smallpox. But in contrast to Wong Wai, Jacobson v. Massachusetts involved a
well-known vaccine and an ordinance that was not facially discriminatory.
Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court offered a powerful endorsement of the
use of law to promote public health. He stated that liberty does not exist unto
itself.54 The only liberty an individual has is that "regulated by law.",55 The law,56
he noted, includes the police power, which aims to support the "common good.,
Protection against an epidemic disease, he added, is clearly part of that good,
indeed, it is "of paramount necessity. 57
Despite this strong endorsement of the police power and its application to
vaccinations, it is important to note that the Court's opinion did not conflict with
the reasoning of the Wong Wai court. First, Justice Harlan's discussion was
carefully grounded in the Court's acceptance of the importance and validity of
vaccination as a method for combating smallpox. 58 The legislature's determination
was not subject to judicial invalidation, according to the Court, given that "strong
support in the experience of this and other countries, no court, much less a jury, is
justified in disregarding the action of the legislature simply because in its or their
opinion that particular method was - perhaps or possibly - not the best either for
children or adults." 59 Of course, in framing its acceptance of mandatory
vaccination in humanity's experiences with smallpox, the Court did not rely upon
and did not cite the type of scientific evidence that would be proffered and perhaps
expected today. Instead, the Court was content to rely simply upon the common
understanding, which had existed for decades, of the efficacy and importance of

51. Id. Hence the vaccine should have been given to people within the quarantine area who were
not yet exposed or people traveling to, rather than from, the city. Id.
52. Id. at 10. Ina second case, the court invalidated again for reasons of discrimination the city's
subsequent quarantine order. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
53. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Many public health scholars have offered interpretations of Jacobson.
See, e.g., Scott Burris, Fear Itself- AIDS, Herpes, and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 479, 479-490 (1985); Elizabeth Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health
Law: Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REv. 869, 890 n.91 (2001); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism,
13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 27-28 (2003).
54. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27.
55. Id.at 27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 34-35 (1905).
59. Id. at 35.
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smallpox vaccination. 60 The opinion, however, did not address how the Court
would have ruled had the city required an individual to be vaccinated with a
relatively untried vaccine such as the Haffkine prophylactic, or for a disease less
universally feared.
Second, while the Court was adamant that it would not second-guess the
legislature's general assessment of the risk/benefit ratio of the smallpox vaccine (of
course the Court did not use such contemporary jargon), it made clear that it was
not deciding whether the state could require an individual who faced a higher,
particularized risk to be vaccinated. The Court cautioned:
It is easy, for instance, to suppose the case of an adult who is embraced
by the mere words of the act, but yet to subject whom to vaccination in
a particular condition of his health or body, would be cruel and inhuman
in the last degree. We are not to be understood as holding that the
statute was intended to be applied to such a case, or, if it was so
intended, that the judiciary would not be competent to interfere and
protect the health and life of the individual concerned. 6 '
In other words, the Court left open the possibility that the Constitution required
individual exemptions, at least when failing to do so would be "cruel and
inhumane" given the individual's own risk to a vaccine.
Since Jacobson, case law has focused on school vaccination laws.62 In Zucht
v. King,63 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal brought under the Equal
Protection Clause to a school vaccination law, noting that Jacobson had settled the
question of a state's power to compel vaccination. 64 Following Zucht, lower courts
have affirmed that school vaccination laws do not deprive students of their rights
of free exercise or due process.65 Nevertheless, all state laws contain some
exemptions. Most states grant religious exemptions, 66 and many states grant

60. There was, to be sure, significant anti-vaccination sentiment at the time. Nevertheless, by
1905 the smallpox vaccine was well-established and well-accepted in medical and more broadly elite
circles, as the laws promoting it attest. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 29, at 844-49.
61. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38-39.
62. There has also been a series of cases on the right of the military to require its personnel to be
vaccinated. See Mazares v. Dep't of the Navy, 302 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bates v. Rumsfeld, 271
F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. D.C. 2002); O'Neil v. Sec'y of the Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d 641 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
Because the liberties of service personnel are severely restricted under all circumstances, these cases are
quite distinct from those pertaining to civilians. For a discussion of this issue, see Randall D. Katz,
Note, Friendly Fire: The Mandatory Military Anthrax Vaccination Program, 50 DUKE L.J. 1835

(2001).
63. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
64. Id. at 176.
65. See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (holding that a state
statute's religious exemption provision based only on "recognized" religions violated the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (finding that the
existence of religious exemptions violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
66. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 29, at 873-74.
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exemptions whenever the parents profess a philosophical objection to
vaccination. 67 In addition, all states provide some exemption from the vaccination
requirement when there is a medical contraindication. 68 Several courts have
insisted that exemptions be granted liberally. 69 Thus, despite the firm legal bases
for the general principle that states can require children to be vaccinated prior to
school, existing law does not support a total abnegation of either individual choice
or individualized decisionmaking.

PART II: INFORMED CONSENT

A. The Many Incarnationsand Purposesof Informed Consent
There is little doubt that the principle of informed consent has taken on a
fundamental, if not "sacramental" status, in contemporary thought.7 0 In different
forms and varied guises, the principle is pervasive in both health law and ethics. In
bioethics, 71 it plays a central role in discussions of human subject
experimentation. 72 Indeed, it was a, if not the, pivotal principle, articulated by the
Nuremberg Declaration.73 But the principle permeates more broadly, and appears
in discussions of the physician-patient relationship, 74 medical privacy, 75 and even

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See LePage v. Wyo. Dep't of Health, 18 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Wyo. 2001) (finding that Dept. of

Health exceeded its statutory authority by requiring more than a written objection from a mother
requesting religious exemption): McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the legislature acted properly to provide broad exemptions); but see Farina v. Bd. of Educ.
of N.Y., 116 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that parents were not entitled to
exemption where the court found that parents failed to show a sufficient nexus between their religious
belief and their desire for exemption).
70. Gail H. Javitt, Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense: Refining FDA Regulation to
Promote the Availability of Products to Counter Biological Attacks, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 37, 77 (2002) (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation
and the Ethics ofAutonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 456 (1996)).

71. For a discussion of informed consent from a bioethical perspective, see Tom L. Beauchamp,
InformedConsent, in MEDICAL ETHICS 185-208 (Robert M. Veatch ed., 1997).
72. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 9 (1993).
73. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1997) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS]; FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 156-57 (1986).

74. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent - Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 69, 77 (1994); Joan H. Krause, ReconceptualizingInformed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment,85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267-78 (1999).

75. Neil C. Abramson, A Right to Privacy Tour de Force into Louisiana Medical Informed
Consent, 51 LA. L. REV. 755 (1991); Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., PersonalPrivacy and
Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86
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the obligations of managed care organizations. 76 As has often been noted in
bioethical discussions, informed consent plays a powerful role in supporting the
values of individual autonomy and dignity. 77

However, as discussed below,

informed consent can also be understood as critical to the development of a
trusting relationship, especially between physicians and patients. 78
Informed consent is also omnipresent in law. Although its spirit can be
traced to the common law of battery, informed consent's origins are often assigned
to Judge Cardozo's paean to self-determination in Schloendorff79 As a matter of
doctrine, the principle is generally dated to 1957 when the court in Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees80 recognized a tort action for a
physician's failure to inform a patient about the known risks of a medical
81
procedure prior to obtaining the patient's consent for the procedure.
While informed consent is best known as an action in tort against a health
care provider for failing to provide a patient with information considered material
to obtaining a patient's consent, 82 variations of informed consent appear more
broadly in modem American health law. For example, notions of informed
consent are essential to federal regulations pertaining to the treatment of human

MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1466-69 (2002); Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related

Information: An Analytical Frameworkfor Sorting Out Hardand Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871,
891-93 (1989).
76. Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A Proposalfor
Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 95, 136-37
(1998); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing
Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1999); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic
Theory ofInformed Consent in ManagedCare, 35 HouS. L. REV. 1631, 1638-39 (1999).
77. E.g., Christine E. Gudorf, Gender and Culture in the Globalization of Bioethics, 15 ST. Louis
U. PUB.L. REV. 331, 346-47 (1996); Elysa Gordon, Note, Multiculturalismin Medical Decisionmaking:
The Notion ofInformed Waiver, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321, 1327-40 (1996).
78. See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J.
LEGAL MED. 157, 216-18 (1998); Dana Ziker, Reviving Informed Consent: Using Risk Perception in
Clinical Trials, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30, 32-37, at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/
articles/2003dltr0015.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005); Dorothy Derrickson, Note, Informed Consent to
Human Subject Research: Improving the Process of Informed Consent from Mentally Ill Persons, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 143, 157-60 (1997).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
80. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
81. Id.at 181.
82. Different jurisdictions impose different standards of care on the physician. Initially, and still in
many jurisdictions, a physician was simply obligated to inform the patient of those risks that it was
customary among physicians to disclose. See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-7 (Kan. 1960)
(setting forth this standard); see also Martin R. Studer, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting
the Patient'sRight to Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85, 88-89 (1987). In
the 1970s, several prominent cases adopted a "patient-centered" standard of care which required the
physician to disclose those risks which a reasonable patient would find material. See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
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subjects ("the Common Rule")8 3 and to the protection of private medical
information (i.e., the "HIPAA regulations"). 84 Informed consent also plays a
prominent role in the federal regulation of pharmaceutical marketing and
advertising85 and even in Oregon's Death with Dignity Act.86 In addition,
conceptions of informed consent permeate duty to warn cases against the
manufacturers of medical products.
As a result, in the discussion below, these
product liability cases will be discussed in conjunction with the more traditional
informed consent cases against medical providers. Finally, the principle of
informed consent has influenced constitutional analysis, especially in cases
concerning a patient's right to decide whether to receive life-saving treatment. 88
Given the myriad incarnations and permutations of informed consent in both
law and ethics, it is overly simplistic and even misleading to assert that the concept
has consistent core elements or clear purposes. Nevertheless, if there are any
common elements to the concept of informed consent, they include the provision
of information to an individual that is pertinent to that individual's decision as to
whether to undergo or forgo a particular medical intervention (including
examinations, treatments, procedures, medication, and vaccinations) and the
recognition that the individual has the right, after receiving the information, to
choose whether to have that intervention. 89 Thus, while courts and ethicists debate
about the standards that should determine what information should be given, and

83. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2003).
84. Uses and Disclosures Requiring an Opportunity for the Individual to Agree or to Object, 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.510 - 164.522 (2003).
85. See William E. Holtz, Consumer-DirectedPrescriptionDrug Advertising: Effects on Public
Health, 13 J. L. & HEALTH 199, 214-15 (1999); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to
Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141 (1997); Timothy
Mclntire, Note, Legal and Quality of Patient Care Issues Arising from Direct-to-Consumer
PharmaceuticalSales, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 105, 127-29 (2002).
86. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.830 (2003).
87. Courts have used the terms "duty to warn" and "informed consent" almost interchangeably.
See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 764 F.2d 373, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1985).
88. E.g., Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) ("IF]or purposes of this
case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
89. Informed consent is most generally applied to cases concerning whether a patient should have
a particular surgical intervention. However, it has also been applied to cases discussing whether a
patient should undergo a routine test or a highly sensitive blood test. See, e.g., Doe v. Div. of Youth
and Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. N.J. 2001) (mother stated a claim under New Jersey Act
when she claimed she withdrew her consent to have her blood tested for HIV); Truman v. Thomas, 611
P.2d 902, 907, 910 (Cal. 1980) (physician must inform patient about the risks of not having pap smear).
Informed consent may also apply to whether a patient should see a particular physician. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (information concerning a physician's past
experience with a procedure is relevant to a patient's decisionmaking and should have been admitted to
help the patient decide whether to take a particular medication).
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how it should be given, 90 all agree that informed consent requires the health care
provider, or the manufacturer of a health care product, to convey information to a
patient that a layperson might not otherwise be expected to know. 91 Moreover, it is
clear that this information is not offered merely so that a patient will know what is
happening to him or her. The concept is not known as "informed acquiescence."
Rather, the information is provided to empower the patient to make a decision
whether to have or forgo the particular test or intervention at issue.9 2 This, of
course, assumes that a patient has a choice to make.93 That is precisely why, in the
case of vaccines mandated by law prior to entering school, the very notion of
informed consent has struck some observers as rather paradoxical.94
Empowering and respecting a patient's right to choose, however, is not the
only purpose furthered by informed consent. Three others warrant consideration:
compensating injured individuals, reducing injuries, and fostering trust. Although
the association of each of these goals with informed consent may, at first glance,
seem inimical to the protection of public health, each goal is actually not only
compatible with public health, but supportive of it, at least in the case of
vaccinations. In the next sections, I examine how informed consent promotes each
of these goals and why they are conducive to protecting public health through
vaccination. I then return to the key element of self-determination and examine its
relationship to public health in the context of vaccines.

90. Compare Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (articulating the reasonable
physician standard), with Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (articulating the
prudent patient standard). More than half the states follow the reasonable physician standard. Ketchup
v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
91. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (noting that "[t]he average patient has little or no
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision").
92. The question of whether the choices of incompetent patients, including minors and those
rendered incompetent by disease or disability, is a complex one which has spawned a plethora of
literature, especially in the context of life-saving treatments. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 423-26 (1974);
Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, and
Refusal of Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 39 (1996); Samantha
Weyrauch, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: Who Decides and By What Standards?, 35
TULSA L.J. 765 (2000). Due to space limitations, this article will assume that the patient is either
competent or that a parent is the appropriate decision maker for a child. The issues that arise with
respect to vaccinations for incompetent patients are difficult and complex but will not be explored here.
93. "Whatever the precise denomination, the duty to secure informed consent reflects a
commitment to patient autonomy and self-determination." Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the
Elusive Dichotomy Between Standardand Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. MED. 361, 364 (2002).
94. See, e.g., Allison v. Merck, 878 P.2d 948, 954-55 n.9 (Nev. 1994) (commenting that there is no
real choice surrounding the issue of school vaccinations).
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B. Informed Consent, Compensation, andPublic Health
Although informed consent is multi-faceted, it began as and remains a
doctrine of tort law. More specifically, informed consent is a cause of action that
patients can bring against health care providers for failing to give them information
material to obtaining their consent to a medical procedure.95 In most jurisdictions,
this action is a species of negligence law. 96 In a small minority of jurisdictions,
informed consent remains a form of battery.97 In either case, an action of informed
consent serves as a mechanism for compensating patients who are injured by
medical encounters.98 Or, to put it another way, the failure to obtain informed
consent can create a liability on the part of a health care provider that can result in
a judgment compensating a patient for a medically-induced injury. 99 As a result of
this liability, providers in the last few decades have increasingly demanded written
"consents" from their patients. These small-print forms may do little to empower
patient decision-making, (or to prevent liability) but they do attest to the salient
role of compensation and liability in popular conceptions of informed consent.
Indeed, one poll found that seventy-nine percent of patients and fifty-four percent
of physicians surveyed believed that consent forms given by health care providers
are simply designed to prevent liability.100 So viewed, informed consent seems to
have little to do with improving public health; instead it would appear primarily as
a vehicle for determining who pays whom.
Likewise, the cause of action commonly known as "duty to warn," which is
closely related to informed consent actions against health care providers, is also
largely about compensation and liability. 10 1 Indeed, courts came to recognize duty
to warn actions against vaccine manufacturers in large part because manufacturers
were in many cases the only party available to provide compensation for an injured

95. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 398 (3rd

ed. 1997).

96. Id.

97. Id. at 398-99.
98. Id. at 397.
99. Id.
100. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is Right" to "Patient has
Rights, " 50 SYRACUSE L.REV. 1243, 1253 (2000). Kurtz states:
Some studies of informed consent have also found that the use of consent forms may only
aggravate patient understanding. On the other hand, in a Lou Harris poll, 65% of the
general public and 64% of physicians agreed that consent forms are helpful .... But, in
this same study 79% of patients and 54% of physicians believed that the primary purpose
of consent forms was to protect physician's [sic] from liability.
Id.
101. See, e.g., Allison v. Merck, 878 P.2d 948, 955 (Nev. 1994) (noting that if a legislature were to
protect vaccine makers from liability for failure to warn, the legislation, "to be just," would have to
include a means of compensation); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1294 (5th Cir. 1974)
(noting that even if imposing liability undermined vaccination campaigns, it would still be important
because courts need to consider the allocation of costs, and in the absence of social insurance, the loss
should not lie with the victim).
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plaintiff. Before the 1970s, under the so-called learned-intermediary doctrine,
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals or other prescribed medical therapies or devices
only had a duty to warn physicians, or other "learned intermediaries," who were
expected to use their expertise and determine the appropriateness of the therapy for
the particular patient.' ° 2 However, in several cases concerning the administration
of polio in clinic settings, courts developed an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine for mass vaccinations. For example, in Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories and Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories10 3 the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
respectively held that "where no individualized medical judgment intervenes
between the manufacturer of a prescription drug and the ultimate consumer, 'it is
the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach the consumer,
' 1°
04
either by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warning.
In other words, manufacturers would have a duty to warn in situations in which
there simply was no other party either to give a warning or to provide
Moreover, because some pharmaceuticals are considered
compensation. 10 5
necessary but "unavoidably unsafe" products, strict products liability actions are
not generally available, except when there is a failure to warn or there is a defect in
the manufacturing process.' 0 6 The duty to warn action is, in effect, the only legal

102. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276.
103. 399 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
104. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Davis, 399 F.2d at 131).
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e (1998) (stating that when a
manufacturer supplies vaccines for use in mass clinics, the law requires a direct warning to patients, if
feasible). The comment goes on to state that "[w]hen the content of the warnings is mandated or
approved by a governmental agency regulation and a court finds that compliance with such regulation
federally preempts tort liability, then no liability under this Section can attach." Id.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). This comment put the matter
quite bluntly:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompaniedby proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.
Id. (emphasis added). The Third Restatement modifies this standard by clarifying that prescription
drugs and medical devices are not governed by the general rules of product defectiveness, but rather, are
defective only if the "foreseeable risks of harm ... are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (c) (1998).
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remedy left standing, and the only common law vehicle for compensation for
injured patients. 107
The compensatory function of these tort actions has often aroused great
criticism. Both health care professionals and manufacturers have charged that
large verdicts in tort actions are deleterious to the public health. 10 8 Critics of
medical malpractice actions have claimed that high verdicts spur frivolous
litigation and lead to unnecessary "defensive medicine."' 1 9 Informed consent
litigation has also been castigated for imposing excessive costs on the health care
system by requiring physicians and other providers to spend more time with
patients than they otherwise would. 1l Not surprisingly, potential defendants have
sought, sometimes successfully, a variety of so-called "tort reforms" to limit the
availability or potency of informed consent actions." l l With respect to vaccines,
Congress has responded to these concerns by enacting several12 alternative
1
compensation schemes that limit the liability of potential defendants.
Manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices have also assailed the
costs of duty to wam cases. They claim that large tort awards undermine the

107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. d (1998) (noting that "[flailure to
instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical
devices").
108. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS), CONFRONTING THE NEW
HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIxING OUR
MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 8-11 (July 25, 2002), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (arguing that the litigation system offers little benefit for patients and fails to
ensure quality care).
109. Id.at 1. From a somewhat different perspective, the Institute of Medicine has suggested that
fear of tort litigation prevent physicians from being open about their errors and willing to undertake the
type of reviews that would be necessary to improve system-wide safety. See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY
OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR iS HUMAN 5 (Kohn et al. eds., 2002).
The Institute of Medicine argues:
The focus must shift from blaming individuals for past errors to a focus on preventing
future errors by designing safety into the system .... But when an error occurs, blaming
an individual does little to make the system safer and prevent someone else from
committing the same error.
Id.
110. The dissent in Truman v. Thomas illuminates this point, saying, "The consent instruction
demanded by plaintiffs will impose upon doctors the intolerable burden of having to explain diagnostic
tests to healthy patients." 611 P.2d 902, 909 (Cal. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting).
111. For a discussion of various so-called tort reforms, see FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 316357.
112. A variety of federal laws exist that create total or limited liability for the manufacturers of
certain vaccines. The broadest of these laws is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA),
Pub. L. No. 99-660, 110 Stat. 3743 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-33
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004)). The Act provides a no-fault compensation scheme for claims (including
duty to warn claims) against manufacturers that plaintiffs must follow prior to bringing tort litigation
with respect to certain listed vaccines. For a discussion of the Act, see Scott, supra note 38; Derry
Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 59 (1999). Interestingly, this Act does not pertain to
informed consent actions against health care workers.
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profitability of the industry and lead to a supply shortage."l 3 In the case of
vaccines, this claim must be taken seriously. The market for vaccines is especially
fragile for several reasons. Under FDA regulations, vaccines, as biologics, are
subject to particularly intense oversight and regulatory monitoring, adding to the
cost of manufacture.'1 4 In addition, in contrast to medications for chronic
conditions that are taken repeatedly, sometimes daily for decades, the market for
vaccines is limited.'1 5 In most cases, individuals are injected just a few times in
their lifetime, making the demand for vaccines far smaller than the demand for
medications taken repeatedly."l 6 Moreover, without government intervention,
there is no ready market for vaccines developed for rare pathogens that could be
used by a bioterrorist, or that may reemerge either by accident or due to changing
environmental circumstances."17 Finally, because the federal government is the
largest purchaser of some vaccines, it has enormous market power which it can use
8
to reduce the price of vaccines."
Given these market conditions and the high costs of informed consent and
duty to warn cases, it is plausible that duty to warn litigation may threaten public
health by reducing the supply of necessary pharmaceuticals or vaccines." 9 This
does not mean, however, that the goal of informed consent to provide a mechanism

113. Lynne Lederman, Protectionfor Vaccine Makers-Product Liability Concerns Continue to
Hinder Vaccine Development, THE SCIENTIST, Oct. 27, 2003, at http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/
20031027/02 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (noting that "[l]awsuits are continuing to have a chilling effect
on vaccine producers ....
").
114. See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines
and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (2002) (noting that manufacturers of vaccines "must satisfy
not only new drug approval requirements but also a separate set of controls governing biologics,
although recent amendments to the regulations have reduced some of these burdensome requirements").
The fragility of the market became especially apparent in fall 2004 when one of the only two
manufacturers licensed to provide flu shots in the United States was unable to deliver due to
manufacturing problems in a plant in England. Denise Grady, Shortage Was Predicted,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2004, at A33.
115. Noah, supra note 114, at382.
116. Id.
117. As a result, the government will fund the development of these vaccines and provide a market
via the national pharmaceutical stockpile. Relevant laws include: Smallpox Emergency Personnel
Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-020, 117 Stat. 638 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
233, 239 & 239a-h (West 2003 & Supp. 2004), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (codifed as amended at 3 U.S.C.A.; 5 U.S.C.A.; 6 U.S.C.A.; 7 U.S.C.A.; 8 U.S.C.A.; 10
U.S.C.A.; 14 U.S.C.A.; 15 U.S.C.A.; 18 U.S.C.A.; 19 U.S.C.A.; 20 U.S.C.A.; 21 U.S.C.A.; 26
U.S.C.A.; 28 U.S.C.A.; 31 U.S.C.A.; 37 U.S.C.A.; 38 U.S.C.A.; 40 U.S.C.A.; 41 U.S.C.A.; 42
U.S.C.A.; 44 U.S.C.A.; 49 U.S.C.A.; 50 U.S.C.A.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
118. GAO, supranote 30, at 5.
119. While I concede the plausibility of this claim, it is important to note that there has been little in
the way of empirical evidence to support the assertion, and that numerous problems, other than the costs
of litigation, affect the supply of vaccines. See Grady, supra note 114.
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to compensate injured patients is inimical to public health. To the contrary,
compensation is an especially necessary component of any public policy designed
to protect public health by encouraging vaccinations.
There are several reasons why, from a public health perspective,
compensation is particularly important for vaccination programs. 120 First, as was
discussed earlier, when there is a low incidence of a disease in a population, either
because of previously successful vaccination campaigns, or because the pathogen
is only threatening or newly emerging, individuals may conclude that the risk of a
vaccine does not warrant the benefits that accrue from being vaccinated.' 2' Under
these circumstances, 122 the availability of compensation may be an important way
of reducing or offsetting individual costs, helping to ensure that a vaccination that
is beneficial to the population is not economically unsound for the individual.' 23 In
effect, compensation serves as an insurance scheme, reducing an individual's risk
and making it more likely that the individual will be willing to undertake the
socially desirable action of being vaccinated. Compensation may therefore be a
tool that can promote public health by realigning public and private costs and
24

benefits. 1

Compensation for vaccination-related injuries may support public health in
another related and critical sense. Vaccination is a public health imperative in part
125
because it benefits a population, not just the individuals who are vaccinated.
Laws that promote (or require) vaccination do so precisely because of this public

120. By "public health perspective" I mean a viewpoint that places significant value on improving
the health of a population qua population. For a more thorough discussion of the public health
perspective, see Parmet, supra note 9, at 1233-37.
121. This may be why the issue of compensation has grown in salience as infectious diseases have
waned in prominence. When people are dreadfully fearful of a disease, they clamor for vaccination and
worry less about the availability of compensation. But when the risks of a disease are lower, an
individual's willingness to be vaccinated appears to decrease. See Schneider & McDonald, supra note
28, at 583 (discussing why individuals were reluctant to be vaccinated against smallpox during the
recent smallpox vaccination campaign).
122. Given the potential harm of a newly arriving infection, this may not always be the case. For
example, if smallpox reappears, individuals would face a significant threat, since the disease, while not
prevalent now, is rapidly contagious. Id. at 580-81. However, in such a scenario, the risks are
inherently uncertain and individuals may well discount their own sense of risks by the uncertainty of the
information. Another factor affecting individuals' perceptions of the risk/benefit ratio in the situation of
a novel or reemerging pathogen is trust. Id. at 583-84. The more individuals trust public health
authorities, the more likely they are to accept that a vaccine is also in their own interest. Id For a
further discussion of this factor, see infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
123. Of course, no compensation scheme can totally offset the costs associated with a vaccinerelated injury. Monetary compensation is obviously an inadequate compensation for death or lifelong
injuries. Nevertheless, in our legal system, monetary compensation is one of the ways we can reduce
these costs.
124. Compensation schemes generally deal with only some of the economic barriers to vaccination.
Studies have noted that underinsurance and significant co-pays reduce vaccination rates. See, e.g.,
FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 17, at 73-89.

125. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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benefit. Yet, without some mechanism for compensation, the individuals who are
injured from vaccination, the very people who did precisely what was urged of
them by public health officials, are the ones forced to bear all of the costs. Such a
regime effectively says that a pathogen is a public concern, but the negative
consequences arising from the effort to protect the public is just a matter of
individual hard luck. This individualistic message clashes with and undermines
the public health perspective that justifies public involvement with vaccines in the
first place.'

26

The importance of compensation to the success of vaccination programs is
evident from the difficulties faced by President Bush's campaign to vaccinate
500,000 first responders against smallpox. Despite the great fanfare with which
the campaign was initiated, and the fears of terrorism that were pervasive in the
wake of September 11th, only 39,353 civilian healthcare workers were vaccinated
under the program.1 27 Many reasons may be given for the low rate of compliance,
including low perceptions of risk, but many scholars studying the program have
also pointed to uncertainty concerning compensation and liability as a prime
cause. 128 According to Schneider and McDonald, the uncertainty and gaps in the
compensation system for smallpox violated a fundamental bond between
individual and community.' 29 They write:
As it was initially announced, the smallpox vaccination campaign asked
citizens to put themselves and potentially their families at risk for the
good of their country ....

While citizens of a democracy are expected

to contribute to the public good, and even to make sacrifices for the
public good, the fundamental premise of a government responsible to its
citizens supposes
that the government will support those citizens
30
equitably.'

The public health need for compensation, however, does not require that
compensation be provided through informed consent litigation. Indeed, from a
public health perspective there are sound reasons to rely primarily upon publiclyfunded compensation programs.
First, as noted above, given the special
circumstances of the vaccine market, tort litigation may cause supply problems. 3 '
Second, tort litigation is both expensive and uncertain, meaning that many who

126. This argument is closely related to those discussed below relating to trust. See infra text
accompanying notes 169-88.
127. Myers et al., supra note 13.
128. See id; Schneider & McDonald, supra note 28, at 583-84. For a thorough analysis of the
liability issues surrounding the smallpox vaccination program, see Richards et al., supra note 39.
129. Schneider & McDonald, supranote 28, at 583-84.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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deserve compensation will not receive it.132 In addition, tort litigation usually fails
to view vaccines and vaccine-related injuries as public problems. Private tort
litigation effectively places the social cost of vaccines on private entities, health
care workers or manufacturers. 133 Although this may be more preferable from a
public health perspective than leaving the costs with injured individuals (since
manufacturers and professionals can spread some of the cost), it still denies the full
public health nature of the undertaking. Especially when there are laws that
in the first
penalize individuals for not being vaccinated, the cost of injuries should
134
instance be borne by the public that benefits from the vaccination.
Perhaps in recognition of these arguments, Congress has repeatedly loosened
the bond between informed consent (or at least the manufacturer's duty to warn)
and compensation, by creating alternative compensation schemes for vaccines
believed to be important to public health.' 3 5 This dissociation of informed consent
from compensation began with the Swine Flu Act of 1976,136 and continues today
with the Project Bioshield Act, recently signed by President Bush. 137 Space here
precludes a careful examination or assessment of the compensation provisions of
these different statutory programs. Several points, however, warrant mention.
First, these compensation programs demonstrate that private tort actions need not

132. HARVARD MED. PRACTICE, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MED. INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION: REPORT OF THE HARV. MED. PRACTICE
STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7-37 to 7-39 (1990).
133. See Noah, supra note 114, at 391 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liabilityfor Medical
Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1154 (1987) (noting that "if the number of false positives

attributed to a vaccine rises sufficiently, then the private costs imposed upon the manufacturer diverge
from the social costs of the vaccine. Systematic underproduction results .... ").
134. See Lisa J. Steel, Note, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This
the Best We Can Do For Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 144, 144-45 (1994) (analogizing
mandatory vaccinations to conscription for war).
135. See supranote 112.
136. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)). This Act authorized the
establishment and implementation of an emergency swine flu immunization program and provided an
exclusive remedy for personal injury or death arising out of the manufacture, distribution, or
administration of the swine flu vaccine under such program. Id. It also held the United States liable for
personal injury or death arising out of the administration of the vaccine and based upon the act or
omission of a program participant in the same manner and to the same extent as the United States would
be liable in any other action brought against it. Id. § 2, 1115-16.
137. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§
247d-6a (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp 2004). Like the Swine Flu Act, Project Bioshield immunizes
manufacturers from liability for harm caused by certain vaccines and other agents, by deeming them
Project Bioshield
federal employees for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. § 2, 839-40.
applies to research and development of qualified countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or
nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack. Id. Like the Swine Flu Act, Project Bioshield Act
does not establish a no-fault compensation system, but allows personal injury claims to be brought
directly against the federal government. Id.
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serve as the primary mechanism for compensation. 138 However, while no-fault
type programs may result in a fairer and more efficient compensation system that
reduces the disincentives to produce vaccines, they may also lead to the
ossification of the informed consent doctrine pertaining to vaccines. Without the
possibility of damages, civil liability actions are seldom brought, and the law of
informed consent, or of the duty to warn, pertaining to vaccines may develop
slowly or not at all. 139 Eventually, this may impede the law's ability to fulfill the
other objectives of informed consent. Moreover, even when civil actions for
informed consent are obliterated and no-fault systems are put in place, informed
consent remains critical as it supplies the "right," or ethical entitlement for
compensation. In a legal system and culture based significantly on individualistic
notions of right and justice, informed consent helps provide the ethical justification
for why individuals who are unavoidably injured by vaccines ought to be
compensated. Without informed consent's articulation of how such people are
wronged, compensation schemes may lose some of their ethical grounding, and
potentially their support, thereby jeopardizing their existence and ability to
promote public acceptance of vaccinations. 40
C. PreventingInjuries

Another critical, but not always obvious, goal of informed consent is the
reduction of medical injuries. This goal is not only compatible with public health,
it is a public health goal. While vaccines have been enormously important to
improving public health, injuries do occur. Although usually unavoidable,
sometimes these injuries can be prevented. For example, in 1955, 260 cases of
paralytic polio and eleven deaths were caused by a polio vaccine that was not
properly inactivated. 14 1 Today,
approximately 10,000 adverse vaccine-related
14 2
events are reported each year.

138. However, other mechanisms are then required to ensure that the core elements of informed
consent are maintained. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.

139. Thus it is not surprising that the leading cases in the field derive from vaccinations prior to the
act. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F. 2d 121
(9th Cir. 1968); Allison v. Merck, 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1991).
140. As long as there is a legal right to informed consent, no-fault programs appear as statutory

reforms that vindicate an individual's right to compensation. These no-fault programs operate in a
relatively efficient manner rather than as welfare programs to aid the injured. Once the legal right to
informed consent is abolished, compensation programs may appear as little more than welfare programs
and may well end up losing support, as welfare programs often do in this society.
141. Milstien, supra note 32, at 176. Following this incident, regulatory changes were made to
increase oversight of adverse events. Id.
142. NATIONAL

IMMUNIZATION

PROGRAM,

CDC,

OVERVIEW

OF

VACCINE

SAFETY

(2003)

[hereinafter OVERVIEW OF VACCINE SAFETY], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe (last visited

Feb. 23, 2005).
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Reducing vaccine-related injuries without reducing overall vaccination rates
aids public health. 143 Informed consent does this in two distinct ways. First, as a
tort action, informed consent is closely related to, and indeed often serves as a
proxy for, a malpractice action against health care providers or a products liability
action against manufacturers.' 44

In informed consent cases, defendants are found

liable only when plaintiffs can demonstrate that the defendant's failure to provide
the required information caused a physical injury.

The mere violation of the

ethical imperative to disclose risks and to act as a fiduciary is insufficient to
provide relief.145 Hence, the informed consent cause of action provides defendants
with a theoretical incentive to reduce physical injuries among patients. 146

Of

course, whether tort actions actually serve to reduce injuries has been heavily

143. This is for two reasons. First, vaccine-related injuries directly impair a population's health.
Second, vaccine-related injuries lead people to resist vaccination. To the extent that injuries are
reduced and that information is conveyed in a trustworthy manner, people may be more likely to accept
vaccination. This does not imply that vaccine-related injuries for the currently licensed vaccine are
significant from a population perspective, they are in fact quite rare. See CDC, SURVEILLANCE FOR
SAFETY AFTER IMMUNIZATION: VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (VAERS) - UNITED
STATES, 1991-2001, 52 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1-2 (Jan. 24, 2003). Between

1991 and 2001, Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System received 128,717 reports of adverse events
from over 1.9 billion net doses of human vaccines. Id. at 1. Of these, clinicians described 14.2% as
serious, by which they meant as causing death, life-threatening illness, hospitalization or permanent
disability. Id. at 2. In addition, there is a great deal of erroneous information available about vaccineinjuries. See Wolfe et al., supra note 22. This information may persist even if injuries become rarer.
Nevertheless, it seems self-evident that public health supports improvements in vaccine safety.
144. Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the
Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 212 (1988); see also Kurtz, supra note
100, at 1244. In jurisdictions that rely upon the prudent patient standard of care, the tort of informed
consent requires less of a reliance upon expert testimony than would an action for malpractice. Korman
v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993) (noting that "expert testimony concerning the
professional standard of disclosure is not a necessary element of the plaintiff's case because the scope
of disclosure is measured from the standpoint of the patient"); Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern
Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed
Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 (1978 & Supp. 2004) (citing Roberson v. Christoferson, 65 F.R.D. 615,
621 (D.N.D. 1975) (finding that while expert medical testimony is necessary to prove negligence, it is
not necessary to prove failure to disclose under a theory of assault and battery)). Nevertheless, given
the fact that providers need only disclose risks that a reasonable patient would find material, it is
exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in an informed consent case when the facts, at least
theoretically, do not suggest negligent care. After all, if the physician's proposed treatment was within
the standard of care and carried out non-negligently, a reasonable patient probably would not have
found the risks material. Moreover, the patient will not generally be able to prove that he or she would
have changed his mind if he or she had known of the risks. As a result, informed consent generally lies
where there is a theoretical possibility of negligence, but the action may be easier for the patient to
bring.
145. Meisel, supra note 144, at 211.
146. For a far more thorough description of the economic incentives of tort law itself, see WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW passim (1987); GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSISpassim (1970).
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debated. 147 As noted above, critics have claimed that malpractice actions lead to
defensive medicine and interfere with more effective methods of reducing
injuries. 148 Others contend that these actions do indeed have some positive
deterrent effect. 149 For present purposes, it suffices to note that informed consent
acts much in the manner of more traditional malpractice actions. In theory it
reduces injuries, but whether it actually does so in practice is debatable.
Likewise, duty to warn actions parallel more traditional products liability
actions and should offer whatever injury prevention benefits are associated with
those actions. 50 Interestingly, duty to warn actions are the tort action of choice for
plaintiffs injured by vaccines precisely because vaccines are believed to be
"unavoidably" dangerous.' 5 ' If this was really the case, duty to warn actions could
not reduce overall injuries.' 52 However, courts that have decided duty to warn
cases have not always accepted the premise that a vaccine or a vaccination
15 3
program may not be made safer. For example, in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
the court answered the claim that liability would undermine vaccination campaigns
by noting that proper warnings would provide plaintiffs with the choice of using a
54
safer vaccine. 1

147. At best, the empirical evidence on malpractice litigation's deterrent effect is mixed. See
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1597-98 (2002).
148. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
149. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? 7 (Mar. 28, 2004), Univ. of Md., Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 2004-08, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=526762 (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 131 (1993) (suggesting that the rate of

injuries due to medical negligence was roughly thirty percent less than it would have be if there were no
malpractice litigation); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter? 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 401 (1994) (stating that the "general threat of liability clearly
affects the behavior of doctors"). But cf, Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort
System and Its Alternatives: A Review of EmpiricalEvidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57, 82-83 (1992)
(critiquing the data used by Weiler and colleagues).
150. Many scholars contend that products liability law, as embodied in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2(a), has

promoted safer products. See Larry S. Stewart, A New Frontier: Design Defect Cases and the New
Restatement, 34 TRIAL 20, 23 (Nov. 1998); Ellen Wertheimer, Calabresi's Razor: A Short Cut to
Responsibility, 28 STETSON L. REV. 105, 127 (1998). For a competing view, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
A PsychoanalysisofNegligence, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 855, 865 (1953).
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §6 cmt. d (1998).

152. The question of whether the vaccine was administered to a person who should receive the
vaccine would remain. For a discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 158-64.
153. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
154. Id. at 1293.
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Of course, it is possible that whatever public health benefits might accrue
55
from informed consent may be better realized by careful regulatory oversight.'
Indeed, recent laws that have provided partial or complete immunity for vaccine
manufacturers seem to rest on this assumption. 56 However, if, as under the recent
federal acts, new vaccines to meet bioterrorist threats may be licensed for use
without full Phase III testing, traditional systems of regulatory oversight may not
be able to ensure adequate efficacy or safety. 157 In these circumstances, the duty to
warn may serve as a useful and perhaps the only incentive to reduce vaccinerelated injuries as much as possible.
So far, the discussion has treated informed consent and duty to warn tort
actions as similar in their deterrent effect upon negligence or products liability
claims. Informed consent, as either a tort action or as a more general legal
principle, however, may also prevent injuries in its own unique way. Recall that
informed consent requires a health care provider or manufacturer to give
information about the risks and dangers associated with a medical procedure or
treatment to a patient. 158 In situations in which the learned intermediary doctrine
applies, and the obligation to obtain informed consent resides primarily with the
health care professional, informed consent demands an interaction between patient

155. That was the premise of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which established a nofault compensation system by which vaccinees injured by certain listed vaccines can petition for a
monetary award and required health care providers to report certain adverse events following
vaccinations and led to the establishment of the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System housed
within the FDA. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 110 Stat. 3743 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S §
300aa-1 to 300aa-33 (Law. Co-op.2003 & Supp. 2004)); OVERVIEW OF VACCINE SAFETY, supra note

142.
156. For example, § 304(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 deems smallpox vaccine
manufacturers to be federal employees, thereby triggering the liability protections of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 233 (West 2003 & Supp.
2004)). Additionally, § 2 of the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003 establishes a
no-fault compensation program for persons injured or killed by smallpox inoculation. Pub. L. No. 108020, 117 Stat. 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 239 (West Supp. 2004)). Finally, § 2(d)(2) of the Project
Bioshield Act of 2004 deems manufacturers of all bioterror countermeasures, including vaccines, to be
federal employees for the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6a).
157. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 356 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (allowing fast-track approval of
vaccines other "priority countermeasures" based solely on animal models without clinical validation).
The approval of such vaccines is predicated on two assumptions: first, that it may not be ethical to
conduct Phase LII testing for diseases that are not now naturally occurring, and second, that an
emergency may warrant the risk of administering a vaccine that may not be as effective or safe as one
currently licensed. Even if we accept the first proposition, the second depends first on the assumption
that officials are correct about the existence and nature of a risk and second that it might not be possible
to make a novel vaccine any safer than it was originally made. Both propositions are questionable.
Indeed, the lack of testing of new vaccines, the retrospective liability of tort law, and the duty to warn in
particular, may provide useful incentives to make a novel vaccine as safe as possible. See Jon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1303-04 (1998).
158. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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and provider that not only helps the patient exercise autonomy, but also gives the
health care professional an opportunity to gain information about the patient's own
health care status.159 Of course, in an ideal world, physicians would have a longstanding, deep relationship with their patients, and would be aware of
contraindications that may exist to a patient receiving a particular vaccine or other
pharmaceutical. However, in the real world of managed care, high mobility, and
medical specialization, physicians and other providers often lack all of the relevant
information about their patients. In these circumstances, informed consent
provides a way of informing the patient about what he or she should tell the
physician.
For example, consider the facts underlying Kemp v. New Jersey. 60 The
plaintiffs were a high school student, vaccinated for rubella while pregnant, and
her infant, born with congenital rubella syndrome.' 6' Because the rubella vaccine
is contraindicated in early pregnancy, 162 and a health care worker, even a family
physician, may not know that a teenage girl is pregnant, the process of obtaining
the girl's informed consent and warning her about the risk to the fetus may provide
the only incentive for the girl to reveal her condition or the possibility of her
pregnancy. 163 Under these circumstances, informed consent may provide an
opportunity for an appropriate individualized assessment of risk and prevent
vaccine-related injuries.
The common law recognized the importance of informed consent and placed
the obligation to have this dialogue on the professional, However, as courts now
appreciate, vaccinations are often given in public health clinics or other mass
settings in which there is no opportunity for a meaningful dialogue between a
health care professional and patient. It is precisely for those situations that the
courts created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine and required
another entity, generally a manufacturer, to provide a warning.' 64 Under these
circumstances, in which there is a chance that a physician will not have preexisting medical information on the patient, the duty to warn would appear to be

159. Jay Katz states that the physician-patient interactions that occur during the informed consent
process can be "useful medical prescriptions" that also "respect patients' wishes to maintain and
surrender autonomy." JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 84 (1984).

160. 687 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1997), 809 A.2d 77 (N.J. 2002). The issues before the court had to do with
construction of the state immunity statute as well as the admissibility of expert testimony. Kemp, 687
A.2d at 716; Kemp, 809 A.2d at 78, respectively.
161. Kemp, 687 A.2d at 716-17.
162. NATIONAL

IMMUNIZATION

PROGRAM,

CDC,

GUIDE

TO

CONTRAINDICATIONS

TO

VACCINATIONS (2004) [hereinafter GUIDE TO CONTRAINDICATIONS], http://www.cdc.gov/nip/recs/

contraindications.htm# (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
163. In this scenario, a teenager may not answer truthfully if asked "might you be pregnant." But a
warning, "you should know that this vaccine can lead to severe birth defects if you are pregnant," might
provide enough of an incentive for a young woman to disclose the possibility.
164. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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even more crucial than a physician's warning to ensure that vaccinations are given
only to those who should receive them.
The fact that informed consent, understood as warnings, promotes public
health does not mean that such warnings need to be given by manufacturers or that
they need to form the basis for tort liability. Instead, some courts have recognized
that manufacturers can satisfy their duty to inform consumers by taking measures
165
to ensure that the CDC issues warnings when vaccines are administered.
Moreover, the NCVIA removes the manufacturers' duty to warn the public directly
and requires instead that vaccines be distributed with warnings provided by the
CDC. 166 Likewise, the CDC's smallpox vaccination guidelines stress the role of
public communication via the mass media and urge public health authorities to use
videos to inform patients about the smallpox vaccine in the event of a smallpox
emergency.' 67 In the case of the smallpox vaccine in particular, which is not
recommended for immuno-compromised individuals, 168 such warnings need to be
given not simply to preclude the possibility of liability, or to satisfy some
preference for individual autonomy, but because they can prevent a public health
problem. In our desire to use vaccinations to protect public health, we need to take
care not to create other public health problems. Informed consent helps to do that.
D. Promoting Trust
One goal of informed consent is to foster "mutual trust and education
between doctor and patient."'' 69 By requiring that health care providers (or
manufacturers) inform patients about the risks of particular medical procedures,
informed consent seeks to promote a trust relationship between patient and
provider, where the provider acts in the interest of the patient and shares with the

165. See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1366 (3d Cir. 1992).
166. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-26(a) (West 2003) requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to develop "vaccine information materials for distribution by health care providers to the legal
representatives of any child receiving a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table." These materials
are to be developed in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Childhood Vaccines, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, health care providers, and
parents' organizations. Id. § 300aa-26(b). The Act expressly relieves manufacturers of civil liability
arising out of a failure to provide direct warnings to an injured party. Id. § 300aa-22(c).
167. CDC, ANNEX 3: GUIDELINES FOR LARGE SCALE SMALLPOX VACCINATION CLINICS 13,

18

(2002) [hereinafter CDC, ANNEX 3], http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/annex3.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
168. GUIDE TO CONTRAINDICATIONS, supra note 162. See also CDC, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ADVISORY
GLOBULINS

COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION

PRACTICES (ACIP): USE OF VACCINES AND IMMUNE

IN PERSONS WITH ALTERED IMMUNOCOMPETENCE,

42

MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY

WEEKLY RPT. 6-7 (Apr. 9, 1993).
169. Meisel, supra note 144, at 210. While noting the importance of this goal, Meisel argues that
the judicial doctrine of informed consent has often failed to vindicate it. Id. See also MARC A.
RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 181-184 (1993)

(discussing informed consent as among a physician's fiduciary obligations).
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patient the information necessary for the patient to make informed choices and to
feel respected in the course of treatment. 170 This trust is often critical to the
success or failure of a therapeutic intervention.' 7 ' While the efficacy of vaccines
themselves almost certainly does not depend upon the existence of a trust
relationship between physician and provider, trust may be critical to a patient's
willingness to be vaccinated, or to have his or her child vaccinated.1 2 In addition,
trust won or lost in interactions concerning vaccinations likely can carry over to
other interventions. 173 For example, a parent who loses faith in a pediatrician who
fails to warn her about a possible side effect for a child from a routine vaccine may
feel less confident in discussing with that same physician another issue affecting
the child's health. Writ large, this erosion of trust can affect a population's
74

health. 1

In many situations, however, vaccines are administered outside of the
physician-patient relationship. In an emergency, this is especially likely to be the
case. As discussed above, in these circumstances, there is little possibility of a
physician-patient dialogue, and the trust, or lack thereof, between the patient and
physician is immaterial. That does not mean, however, that trust remains
unimportant to public health or that informed consent plays no role in furthering it.
Rather, it suggests that the trust that is at stake is that between the public and
public health system. By providing informed consent, the public health system can
help nurture that trust.
In the years since September 11 th and the ensuing anthrax attacks, numerous
scholars have considered the role of public trust in developing emergency
responses. While the initial reaction to the terrorist events of 2001 may have been
to assert the importance of aggressive and even coercive measures, many experts

170. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The patient's reliance upon
the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated
with arms-length transactions"); Mark. A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 48990 (2002) (remarking that informed consent is the most prominent example of fiduciary law); David
Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 661, 672-73 (discussing the importance of disclosure and informed consent to patients' trust
of physicians).
171. See Mechanic, supra note 170, at 662 (noting that the erosion of trust damages the
effectiveness of medical interventions).
172. Studies confirm the importance of communication between physicians and parents in
determining whether parents will consent to have their children vaccinated. See Fredrickson et al.,
supra note 21, at 436-437.
173. Hence a patient who feels a great deal of trust in a physician may feel less needful of receiving
information about the possible adverse affects of a vaccine. If the patient has a great deal of trust in the
physician, she may be more willing to take the physician's word that the vaccination should be given.
174. See Mechanic, supra note 170, at 662 (noting that "trust is an essential 'glue' that holds
communities together and allows us to pursue our affairs without excessive suspicion, policing, and
regulation. The erosion of trust, therefore, damages the effectiveness of medical interventions, and
invites legislative and regulatory micromanagement of health affairs.").
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have come to realize that any public health response to a bioterrorist event (or
manmade health emergency) must necessarily rely primarily upon a population's
willingness to comply. 71 5 This in turn requires trust, as nurtured by the information

provided by informed consent. 176
The world's experience in 2003 with SARS illustrates the point. While that
experience highlighted the importance of surveillance and fastidious observation of
infection control procedures in hospitals, 7 7 it also demonstrated the importance of
trust in public health. Although quarantines and other isolation measures were
used in Toronto, the city in this hemisphere most affected by the epidemic,
authorities had to resort to obtaining a court order in only one instance. 78 Instead,
the provincial government relied, mostly successfully, on the public's voluntary
compliance with suggested public health measures. 179 In contrast, governments
that emphasized more coercive measures may have instilled panic in their
populations.1 8 0 Certainly, in a wide-spread emergency, voluntary compliance will

175. See Working Group on "Governance Dilemmas" in Bioterrorism Response, Leading During
Bioattacks and Epidemics with the Public's Trust & Help, in 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE, STRATEGY, PRACTICE, & SCIENCE 25, 31 (2004) [hereinafter Working Group on

"Governance Dilemmas"]; Eric Aakko, Risk Communication, Risk Perception and Public Heath, 103
WIS. MED. J. 25, 25-27 (2004); George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public
Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1171, 1179 (2003); James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the
Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV.
1191, 1218-19 (2003). It is interesting to note that in all recent public health crises requiring the mass
vaccination of civilians, public health officials have indeed relied upon voluntary vaccinations. For
example, in 1947, smallpox reappeared in New York. Working Group on "Governance Dilemmas,"
supra, at 31. The public health department instituted a massive, voluntary immunization campaign that
stopped the outbreak. Id. Likewise, in 1976, faced with what appeared to be the prospect of a massive
swine flu epidemic, the government enacted a program that encouraged and promoted, but did not
mandate, vaccination. See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-380, 90
Stat. 1113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)). Given the fact that
the dreaded epidemic never arose, the one "silver lining" of the episode was the fact that the
government did not use involuntary measures. Had it used such measures, the damage to public health
would have been enormous.
176. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a
City Against Panic,34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 221 (2002).

177. C. David Naylor et al., Learning from SARS in Hong Kong and Toronto, 291 JAMA 2483,
2486 (2004); Robert A. Weinstein, Planningfor Epidemics - The Lessons of SARS, 350 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2332, 2332-34 (2004). These reports also point out the need for a sufficient surge capacity, so
that health care may be provided during an emergency.
178. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON SARS AND PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH CANADA, LEARNING

FROM SARS: RENEWAL OF PUB. HEALTH IN CANADA 178 (2003).

179. Id. The report argues that there is a strong "duty to care" for those who were subject to
isolation and quarantine orders. Id. This duty corresponds closely to the discussion above about the
need to provide compensation to individuals for the costs they incur in following public health
directives. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
180. MARK

A.

ROTHSTEIN

ET

AL.,

UNIVERSITY

OF LOUISVILLE

SCHOOL OF

MEDICINE,

QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS: A REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR

DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 9 (2003) (reporting that officials in Taiwan believe that
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be essential if for no other reason than the fact that there will not be sufficient
resources to compel people to follow public health directives.18'
Informed consent is a necessary ingredient for public trust of public health. 182
Without clear information about the risks and benefits of a public immunization
campaign, as well as a clear statement of what is not known, the public may be
understandably skeptical and resistant to being vaccinated. 183 The public may also
be more likely to panic and act in counterproductive ways if they are not given
practical and credible information.' 84 When SARS struck Toronto, public
communication and information played a major role in stopping the epidemic. The
Province of Ontario conducted a massive public education campaign, which
included maintaining frequently updated websites, daily press conferences by
public health leaders, 8 5 and a SARS telephone hotline, which received over
300,000 calls. 18 6 This type of public communications effort is not what we usually
think of as informed consent, but it is, in effect, a public version of informed
consent.' 87 And88 it is one that not only abets public health, but is essential to it in
an emergency.

aggressive use of quarantine in that country may have contributed to public panic, and thus proved

counterproductive to containment efforts).
181. George Annas quotes Senator Sam Nunn, who played the president in the Direct Winter
exercise, as saying, "[t]here is no force on earth strong enough to get 250 million Americans to do
something that they do not believe is in their own best interests or that of their families." Annas, supra
note 175, at 1179.
182. See Weinstein, supra note 177, at 2334 (discussing public trust in relation to SARS).
183. See Glass & Schoch-Spana, supra note 176, at 221 (emphasizing the importance of
communication to public trust). Here Rudolph Guiliani's comments to New Yorkers on September
1 th are probably the model of transparency. He told the public what was known and what was not
known and by the clarity and transparency of his remarks, was able to maintain calm and order in the
face of the greatest disaster ever to strike the nation. John Schwartz, The Truth Hurts; Efforts to Calm
the Nation's Fears Spin Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, § 4 at 1. In contrast, incomplete
and ultimately misleading remarks from Secretary Tommy Thompson at the start of the anthrax attacks
may have undermined the government's credibility in that tragedy. Id. See also Glass & SchochSpana, supra note 176, at 221. Certainly the unwillingness of many postal workers to be vaccinated,
when the CDC recommended it, and the willingness of many people to take Cipro, when they had no
known exposure, suggests that the public lacked trust in their public health officials in the wake of the
anthrax attacks. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Nation Challenged Steps Against Anthrax; Civilians
are Reluctant to Join U.S. Test of Anthrax Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A13 (postal workers
exposed to anthrax are very unwilling to be vaccinated); Schwartz, supra (discussing how poor
communication by the government regarding the anthrax attacks exacerbated panic); Jane Gross, A
Nation Challenged- The Doctors; Doctors Face Threat, and Fear, of Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2001, at BI (discussing public demand for Cipro as a result of panic over anthrax).
184. Glass & Schoch-Spana, supranote 176, at 218.
185. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supranote 180, at 32.
186. Weinstein, supra note 177, at 2334.
187. See infra notes 229-32 for a further discussion of this model of informed consent.
188. Glass & Schoch-Spana, supra note 176, at 219-221 (emphasizing the importance of effective
communication strategies in bioterrorism planning).
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E. Dignity and Self-Determination
Although the legal doctrine of informed consent has often been criticized
189
both courts and ethicists
for failing to be faithful to a patient's autonomy,
9
recognize that patient autonomy is a key goal of informed consent.' " Informed
consent furthers autonomy by providing patients with information necessary to
making an informed choice that is properly reflective of their values and
outcomes. 191
In recent decades, the value given to autonomy in American law and
bioethics has been the subject of criticism from numerous quarters. Some feminist
bioethicists claim that the focus on autonomy has obscured the importance of
relationships. 192 Communitarians have challenged the very notion that individuals
have autonomous preferences and can be understood apart from and as more
important than the communities in which individuals exist. 193 Public health
advocates, invoking the spirit of Jacobson, have claimed that autonomy cannot be
an absolute value and that it must give way at times to the greater good of public
health. 19
Space precludes a full discussion of the concept of autonomy or its
relationship to public health. However, in considering the role of informed consent
for vaccinations in the advent of a public health emergency, two separate issues
require discussion: first, the role of informed consent in those situations in which
vaccinations are not absolutely mandatory, and second, the extent to which selfdetermination and individual choice should be respected during public health
emergencies.
In light of Jacobson and state laws that require children to be vaccinated
prior to entering school, respecting informed consent for its furtherance of patient
autonomy may seem either superfluous or disingenuous. Why, after all, should we
demand an undertaking that exists to promote self-determination in situations in

189. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protectedinterest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 298-99 (1985).
190. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and
Informed Consent, in MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, VOL. III: APPENDICES STUDIES ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 63, 66 (1982).

191. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 780.
192. E.g., Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia,in FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 299 (Susan M. Wolf, ed. 1996).
193. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 32-

33 (2d ed. 2001); Elizabeth Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law: Lessons
From the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REV. 869, 918-20 (2001); Joanna K. Weinberg, Whose Right Is It
Anyway? Individualism, Community, and the Right to Die: A Commentary on the New Jersey
Experience, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 119, 163-67 (1988).
194. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2000).
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which individuals may have no choice at all? Several answers can be given. One
answer, as suggested by the analysis above, is that informed consent promotes
many goals in addition to self-determination. Even when individuals have no
choice, informed consent may be critical to ensuring that they give critical
information to their health care provider or public health authority. 195 Likewise,
informed consent may remain useful as a vehicle for determining liability and
compensation or for promoting a better relationship between patient and
physician. 9 6 Moreover, the absence of choice does not necessitate the complete
elimination of respect for the individual. Even when people are required to submit
to an undertaking, they are likely to feel better about it if they are given an
explanation as to why that must be the case. "Because I told you so," may or may
not work with small children, but it certainly is not apt to foster trust with a
population of adults.
More importantly, the fact that the state may require a vaccination in some
circumstances does not mean that no choices exist. For example, even when the
Court in Jacobson upheld the ability of the city to penalize an individual for
refusing a vaccination, it suggested that exemptions might have to be given to
individuals who can demonstrate that the vaccine would be especially dangerous to
them. 19 7 Without the relevant material information, an individual might not be
able to exercise this limited, but potentially critical choice. Likewise, all states that
require schoolchildren to be vaccinated permit some medical exemptions.' 98 Again,
the exercise of these limited choices may well depend upon informed consent.
In addition, even in the vast majority of cases in which there is no medical
reason to exempt an individual from a required vaccination, a choice, albeit a
limited and difficult one, remains. In Jacobson, the plaintiff was left with the
choice of being vaccinated or paying a five dollar fine.' 99 Today, the choice
available may be to home-school a child. In both a formal and a practical sense,
this is not much of a choice. Many individuals are not able to educate their
children at home.2 00 Likewise, the choice suggested by a model emergency health
powers act to be vaccinated or remain in isolation is not much of a choice.2z '

195. Thus, even if the hypothetical teenager discussed above was required by law to take the
vaccine if recommended by the school nurse, informed consent may be vital to enabling the nurse to
learn of the teenager's pregnancy, which might lead the nurse to exercise her authority to conclude that
the teenager should not be vaccinated. See supranotes 160-63 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 160-64, 169-74 and accompanying text.
197. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905).
198. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
199. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 14.
200. See Zenaida A. Gonzalez, Students Learning at Home, FLA. TODAY (Brevard County, Fla.),
Sept. 24, 2000, at 1.
201. MSEHPA, art. VI; Gostin, supra note 53, at 18-20. The fact that informed consent may be
necessary even when the choice is limited to vaccination or quarantine does not itself speak to the
appropriateness of the limited set of options given. See Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux:
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But, few choices (if any) are fully free. The difficulty of the choice, and the
fact that the state may skew it by favoring one option over the other, does not
negate the importance of being informed when making it. In other words, the fact
that the state may use the law to make it costly to exercise a particular choice does
not undermine the importance of allowing people to make that choice with as much
information as a reasonable person would find relevant. Unless the state forcibly
injects people against their will, which the state only has the power to do in limited
circumstances when individuals are incompetent, 20 2 reasons remain to obtain
informed consent.
There is, moreover, a deeper and more critical reason for providing
informed consent, even in those situations in which the law limits an individual's
2
action. As discussed above, public health relies significantly on public trust.

3

At

times, the health of a population may warrant, from a public health perspective, the
limitation of an individual's liberty of action. 20 4 However, in time such limitations
will neither succeed nor remain in place unless the public broadly consents to
them. Unpopular public health laws, even when they are effective in terms of
population health, simply will not remain in place or be enforced unless they are
broadly accepted, or at least tolerated.20 5 In the long run, public health laws
require public consent. And just as individual consent requires information, so
does public consent. Unless a population understands why a vaccination is being
required and what risks may follow from that vaccination, it is not likely to
continue to submit to public health authorities or grant them the authority they seek
to require vaccinations or deal with the next emergency. Hence, even when

Bioterrorism, AIDS, and the Curtailment of Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13
HEALTH MATRIX 85, 110-15 (2003).

202. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003) (holding that the "Government [may]
involuntarily ...

administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant ...

to render [him or her]

competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate [and] unlikely to have side
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial [and only if there are no] less intrusive
alternatives"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-227 (1990) (while recognizing that the
individual has a "significant" constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic medication, a state may forcibly administer such medication to a
mentally ill prisoner if the prisoner is dangerous to himself or others and the medication is in the
inmate's medical interest); Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Mass. 1999) (asserting right of competent
patient not involved in the criminal justice system to refuse life-sustaining care).
203. See supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
204. Gostin, supra note 9, at 1159-69 (establishing a framework for determining when liberties
should be limited for public health).
205. For example, while motorcycle helmet laws are apparently effective in reducing injuries, they
remain widely unpopular and are increasingly being repealed throughout the nation. See Matthew L.
Wald, As Risks Make a Helmet More Vital, Fewer Motorcyclists Wear One, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2004,
at A 13. In any political system in which public health laws remain accountable to officials, popular
acceptance remains crucial. Unless a public understands and accepts the expert conclusion that a
limitation on liberty will be efficacious and warranted, the limitation will not remain in place.
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individuals are deprived of their choices, the public is not. The public still requires
informed consent.20 6
So far, the discussion has focused on why informed consent remains crucial
even when the state mandates vaccination. The question remains: should selfdetermination itself be vindicated? In response, it is important to recognize that
absolute self-determination never exists. Individual choices are always influenced
and constrained by the context in which they are made and the options that exist.
Laws can alter those options. Indeed, they inevitably help to shape the social
context in which options are exercised.20 7 Public health laws act, in part, by
influencing and shaping the context. Consider again the issues raised by childhood
vaccine laws. These laws have helped us to obtain high rates of vaccination among
schoolchildren. They do this not only by coercing individuals, but also by
establishing norms and routines for childhood vaccinations. Most parents agree to
their child being vaccinated when their health care providers discuss vaccination
with them. 20 8 Childhood vaccination laws likely help to ensure that those
discussions and vaccinations occur, by prompting parents to bring their child to a
doctor or public health clinic, by highlighting for health providers their obligation
to discuss vaccination, and by ethically obligating the state to ensure the
accessibility of vaccinations. Without the legal requirement to vaccinate a child, it
is debatable whether any of the above would occur with the regularity or frequency
with which they occur. In other words, a law that appears on its face to be coercive
or a violation of self-determination probably operates more by changing norms and
providing the impetus and means for voluntary compliance than by actual
compulsion. Indeed, given the fact that some means exist in all states for parents
to seek exemptions, and that these laws have existed without repeal for over a
hundred years, it does not seem inappropriate to suggest that the population
consents to such laws.

209

On the other hand, the success and acceptance of these laws may not justify
the imposition of mandatory vaccinations in all situations in which a public health
official might conclude that vaccinations would provide protections against a
potential epidemic. 210 While public health officials in an emergency may be
tempted to think that quick and decisive action is required, justifying the use of

206. This point is closely associated with the discussion above relating to the importance of trust.
See supra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
207. Scott Burris et al., Integrating Law and Social Epidemiology, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 510,
513-18 (2002) (discussing law's role in shaping determinants of health).
208. Fredrickson et al., supra note 21, at 437.
209. This does not mean that they have no opponents. It does suggest that few parents ultimately
feel that they are being coerced and the community at large does not experience the laws as unduly
authoritarian.
210. Obviously a mandatory vaccination could not be justified by any mode of ethical or legal
reasoning unless this prerequisite was made. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905)
(cautioning that the police power should not be arbitrarily exercised).
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compulsion and the abrogation of informed consent, it is possible that just the
opposite is the case. In contrast to school vaccination laws, an emergency edict
mandating a vaccination cannot work by shifting customs and creating an
alternative environment in which vaccination becomes normalized. Nor can an
emergency order gain its legitimacy by surviving decades of debate and judicial
challenge. If public officials are to rely upon compulsion in an emergency, their
use of force may well be perceived as truly coercive. As discussed above, this may
erode trust in the public health system during an emergency at just the very
moment in which trust is most urgently needed.2 1 Of course, this may not happen.
If the public is given sufficient information and there is a pre-existing deep well of
trust, it may submit willingly to significant restrictions of liberty ("informed
acquiescence"). Unfortunately, we cannot know whether this will occur until after
the fact.
There is another issue that requires consideration in the emergency context.
In light of the threat of bioterrorism and new infections, the federal government is
supporting the development of new vaccines. 212 Because these vaccines are
intended for diseases that are not currently threatening human populations, they
may have to be approved without the standard human clinical trials. 213 As a result,
public health officials will have far less information about the efficacy or risks
associated with these vaccines than they do about the vaccines that have been
mandatory for civilian populations in the past.214 In effect, these vaccines will be

211. See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
212. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 allows
for fast-track approval of vaccines and other anti-terrorism countermeasures for which clinical data is
insufficient for traditional FDA approval. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 595 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 356-1 (West 2003)). In addition, the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 requires the appropriation of $5.6
billion for vaccine and countermeasures research and development over the next ten years. Pub. L. No.
108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
213. Sections 122 and 123 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, for instance, authorize the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services to designate a potential vaccine or countermeasure for "priority review" by the FDA as
a "fast-track product" under sections 515 and 506 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
356, (2000). 21 U.S.C.A. § 356-1 (West 2003). Products can be approved under this section without
clinical trials, and subsequently administered to the public as enrollees in so-called "postmarketing
studies." See Approval Based on Evidence of Effectiveness from Studies in Animals, 21 C.F.R. §
314.610(b)(1) (2003); Approval Based on Evidence of Effectiveness from Studies in Animals, 21
C.F.R. § 601.91(b)(1) (2004). The FDA has promulgated a rule that requires notice to patients
administered a product that was approved under section 123 without clinical studies. New Drug and
Biological Drug Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,988, 37,990 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
314, 601). The rule provides that patients must be informed of the product's risks and benefits,
contraindications, and told that the drug was approved only on the basis of animal studies. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 314.610(b)(3) (for drugs); 601.91(b)(3) (for biologics).
214. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) dealt with a similar situation at the start of the Persian
Gulf War by requesting and receiving a waiver of the Food and Drug Administration's informed
consent requirements to test pyridostigmine bromide and other unapproved countermeasures on soldiers
without their permission.

JONATHAN D. MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON
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akin to experimental interventions, even if they are fully approved by federal
authorities.
Given an emergency, it may well be appropriate to approve and recommend
vaccines for which we do not have complete information. It is difficult, however,
to argue that it would ever be appropriate to use the law to coerce civilians to
submit to such vaccinations. 215 Indeed, if self-determination and informed consent
are ever critical, they are especially so in the case of uncertain treatments, as the
court recognized over a hundred years ago in Wong Wai. 2 16 This is not only
because both domestic and international law are clear about the importance of
informed consent when humans are the subject of medical experiments, 2 17 but
because in such a situation we cannot be confident that the medical intervention
proposed will in fact benefit the patient (or even the population). In the face of
uncertainty, neither traditional principles of medical beneficence nor arguments
based upon expertise can support mandatory vaccination.218 We cannot justify a
limitation upon an individual's liberty on the theory that we are helping that
individual or protecting her community because we really do not know whether we
are doing either. Indeed, it is possible in some circumstances that the risks to both
individuals and the community of taking a novel vaccine will end up being greater
than the risk of the feared epidemic.2 19 Under these difficult and fearsome
circumstances, informed consent, of both the individual and the public, is more
important than ever, not only to protect individuals, but to protect the public.

HUMANS 270-71 (2000); Michael O'Connor, Note, Bearing True Faith and Allegiance? Allowing
Recovery for Soldiers Under Fire in Military Experiments that Violate the Nuremberg Code, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 649, 661-62 (2002).

215. The military, however, can require service personnel to be vaccinated. See, e.g., Mazares v.
Dep't of Navy, 302 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2002); O'Neil v. Sec'y of Navy, 76 F.Supp.2d 641, 645

(W.D. Pa. 1999). The military can require this even if there is no informed consent, see Doe v.
Sullivan, 756 F.Supp. 12, 18 (D. D.C. 1991), affd 938 F. 2d 1370, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also
Robyn Pforr Ryan, Should Combat Troops Be Given the Option of Refusing Investigational Drug
Treatment?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 377, 382 (1999).
216. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
217. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note

73, at 181-182, which commands an absolute prohibition on human experimentation without informed

consent. Domestic law permits it in limited situations, such as when individuals are incompetent or
when there is no risk of harm. Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 413, 439
None of these exceptions would apply to a law requiring competent individuals to take an
(1979).

experimental vaccine. On the other hand, it is important to note that in the scenario discussed, the
vaccine would be administered not for the purpose of research, but to provide protection for the
individual and population.
218. Katz, supra note 72, at 81-82.

219. This is certainly true in the event that the pathogen itself is novel and its impact not well
understood, or if the risk of an occurrence turns out to be less than predicted.
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PART

III:

INFORMED CONSENT FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

Informed consent is generally viewed as an individual right. But as the
discussion above suggests, informed consent may be supportive of, if not vital to,
public health. By providing information to individuals about recommended
medical interventions such as vaccinations and by helping to compensate
individuals when they are injured, informed consent helps to foster trust and a
willingness to comply with public health recommendations.
Likewise, by
demanding that individuals be forewarned about specific risks associated with
interventions such as vaccines, informed consent helps to prevent the inappropriate
application of such interventions. And by respecting choices, however broad or
limited they may be, informed consent provides individuals and communities with
the respect and knowledge necessary for their acceptance and support of public
health procedures.
The recognition that informed consent may serve public health goals does not
mean, however, that traditional formulations of informed consent are those best
suited to the promotion and protection of public health. As the courts recognized
over thirty years ago when they limited the scope of the learned intermediary
doctrine,22 ° in the case of vaccinations for epidemics, the vision of informed
consent as a private, clinical encounter between physician and patient is quite
inappropriate. What is needed instead is a public health formulation of informed
consent. Such a formulation should promote the core goals of informed consent the provision of information necessary to making an informed choice, as well as
the subsidiary goals of providing compensation, preventing unnecessary injuries,
and promoting trust. However, a public health version of informed consent would
move the locus of responsibility from a clinician or manufacturer to a public health
authority, and the audience from individual to community. It would also ensure
that the information provided would include not simply the risks and benefits
applicable to individuals but also the risks and benefits that a given vaccination
provides to a population.
To some degree, federal legislation has already moved us in this direction.
For example, both the NCVIA221 and the SEPPA 2 22 provide, although perhaps
inadequately, 22 3 for public compensation of injured individuals. These
compensatory schemes recognize, in different ways, both that compensation is
critical to the success of vaccination programs and that the cost of vaccine-related

220. See supranotes 10 1-07 and accompanying text.
221. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 110 Stat. 3743 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-I to 300aa-33 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
222. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-020, 117 Stat. 638
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
223. See Richards et al., supra note 39.
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injuries is a social cost that should be borne by the public that is benefiting from a
vaccination.224 Likewise, both the NCVIA and the Project Bioshield Act recognize
a public role for the provision of information about vaccine risks. Thus, the
NCVIA delegates to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services the development of vaccine warnings and relieves manufacturers of
liability if they convey the government-issued warnings. 225 Likewise, the Project
Bioshield Act requires the Secretary "to ensure to the extent practicable" that
certain disclosures are made to recipients when the product is administered.226 In
addition, the CDC's smallpox preparedness plan includes significant consideration
227
of the information that needs to be conveyed by public health authorities.
While important first steps, these laws do not fully embrace a public health
conception of informed consent. In particular, three elements appear wanting.
First, these laws do not provide for accountability from public health officials.
While relieving private clinicians and manufacturers of their former legal
obligations, the laws do not provide any mechanism to ensure that public health
officials will play the role expected of them. Most critically, these laws do not
hold public health agencies accountable for warnings that are inadequate or
incomplete, or for warnings that are not publicized. While there are important
reasons to provide public health officials with wide latitude and significant
protection from liability, the "right" to informed consent is no longer a "right" if
there is no means to enforce it. Moreover, given the strong incentives that public
health officials have to encourage vaccination use, a real danger exists that
important limiting information (including those relevant to the determination of
contraindications) will be downplayed unless there are existing counterincentives.
If public health professionals are to gain the public's trust and replace clinicians
informing agent, they must bear some responsibility for
and manufacturers as the228
doing the job adequately.
Second, more attention needs to be given to the public provision of
information. Currently, the primary locus for information about vaccinations
remains clinical encounters.229 Public health authorities recognize that this will not
be possible in an emergency. But, is the expectation that information will be
conveyed in clinical encounters ever appropriate for vaccinations that are given to

224. See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l, 300aa-22 (2000).
226. 108 Pub. L. No. 276, 118 Stat. 825 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
227. CDC, ANNEX 3, supra note 167, at 13, 18.
228. In suggesting that public health departments and agents should replace individual actors as the
agents primarily responsible for informed consent, I am not suggesting that individuals should be
relieved of all liability. As with existing law, manufacturers must be liable when they withhold
information from public authorities or convey misleading information to either the public or
individuals.
229. Fredrickson et al., supra note 21, at 437.
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protect the public? If the benefits of routine vaccinations are to the public, and the
provision of information about their risks and benefits can promote vaccination,
then the assumption that information, even that which is prepared by public
authorities, shall be given primarily when an individual is about to be vaccinated
seems insufficient and inappropriate. It is insufficient because information given
at that time will often only reach individuals who have already decided to be
vaccinated.23 ° It is also inappropriate because the dissemination of information
from clinician to patient fails to display the responsibility of public health agencies
and it fails to develop trust in those agencies. If in every situation short of a crisis,
individuals receive information from their doctor, public health officials will not be
able to build a level of trust that they will need to draw upon if and when an
emergency arises and there is no time for individuals to turn to their clinicians.
This suggests that it may be important for public health officials, at the federal
level and especially at the state and local levels, to begin to provide their
communities with more visible and prominent information about the risks and
231
benefits of vaccinations now, well before any emergency exists.
Finally, we need to reconsider the content of the information conveyed.
Currently the information that public health authorities generally provide about
vaccinations remains unduly influenced by individualist conceptions of informed
consent.
For example, the CDC's "Parent Guide to Vaccines" provides
information about the risks an individual child faces if he or she is or is not
vaccinated.232 Oddly, the Guide says nothing to parents about the benefits that
others obtain when a parent agrees to vaccinate a child. The information is all cast
in an individualistic frame.
This is troubling for a number of reasons. First, it is misleading. It does not
explain to parents the real reason why the government wants them (or requires
them) to vaccinate their child. If a parent is not informed about the public benefit
of vaccination, a parent may well respond thinking, "yes, but I know what is best
for my child." Further, the parent may resent the state's intrusion in what appears
to be a "private" decision. If, however, the government explains to the parent why
the decision is not private, and how it affects other people, especially sick and

230. This may not be the case with respect to infant vaccinations. Infants are far more likely than
young and middle aged adults to see physicians regularly, thereby giving a physician the opportunity to
discuss with a parent the pros and cons of vaccination, even if a parent had not previously decided to
opt in favor of vaccination. An adult, however, may not see a physician for long periods of time and
may not hear from the physician why he or she should be given a flu vaccine unless the adult makes an
appointment to receive the vaccine.
231. In saying this, I recognize that public health authorities are already overstretched and
underfunded. However, if informed consent is important to achieving high vaccination rates in an
emergency, then the development of trust between public health authorities and the public with respect
to vaccines needs to be understood as not separate from but a component of emergency planning.
232. NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM, CDC, PARENTS GUIDE TO CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/Parents-Guide/default.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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vulnerable children in the child's community, perhaps the parent will have a
different attitude. Unless we provide parents with the full story, we should not
assume their lack of interest in their neighbor.
More critically, if a public health emergency arises, it will be especially
important for individuals to understand the public consequences of the decisions
they make (e.g., to be vaccinated, to refrain from being vaccinated, to abide by a
recommendation to wear a face mask, etc.). 233 Yet, it may be overly optimistic to
assume that individuals will comprehend the public costs of their actions and
develop the habit of taking the health of others into account at the moment at
which an emergency arises. In a world in which we have come to think of our
health care as our own business, and in a culture in which "good workers" don't
stay home with influenza, people are apt not to appreciate the public health
consequences of their actions. If we want them to do so during an emergency, we
would be wise to provide them with the reasons to do so before an emergency
occurs. Informed consent about routine vaccinations, including flu vaccines, may
provide the golden opportunity. Properly framed and publicly disseminated, the
information provided about vaccines can begin the process of reminding people of
the public impact of their health care decisions and the public benefits of vaccines.
So understood, informed consent can change from an individual right potentially in
conflict with public health, to a public undertaking that strengthens it.

233. The importance of educating people about the public health nature of vaccines became very
apparent last fall when the United States faced a shortage of influenza vaccines. Suddenly the problem
health officials confronted was not the refusal by some individuals to heed the call to be vaccinated, but
the need to persuade individuals and clinicians to limit vaccinations to high risk individuals. The CDC
responded by issuing recommendations to effectively ration the supply of vaccines. CDC, DHHS,
INTERIM INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS - 2004-05 INFLUENZA SEASON (Oct. 5,
2004), at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/whoshouldget.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). Some states
E.g., DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH,
issued orders limiting vaccinations to high risk individuals.
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hup://www.mass.gov/dph/cdc/epii/flu/flu-order.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005). To be effective, both the non-binding recommendations and the binding
state regulations require compliance and cooperation from clinicians and patients who understand and
appreciate that vaccinations are not merely an individual medical intervention but a public good that in
times of shortage should rightly be distributed in a way that is most protective of the public health.
DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF INFLUENZA VACCINE,

